Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Targeting an enemy leader, as a form of offensive command and control warfare is neither a panacea nor a veritable Pandora's Box, but can be a valuable element to a campaign plan when properly considered and planned. In Operational Warfare, Milan Vego's discussion of operational design includes the statement, " [O] ne option that could be more effective, but is politically and legally too sensitive to consider, is to pose a direct threat to such authoritarian or totalitarian rulers and their inner circle." The law governing armed conflict, like all law, changes as societies and technology change. This too adds to the difficulty in concluding just what the rules are as they apply to contemporary situations. Early laws of war were based primarily on chivalry and denounced dishonorable methods of combat, methods that are readily acceptable and "lawful" today. For instance at one time the use of a crossbow was condemned as a weapon that allowed one to strike an enemy without the risk of being struck.
ii Yesterday's treachery, more fully explained below, is today's doctrine.
Before getting to the specifics with respect to targeting an enemy leader, it is important to set forth some basic principles of the law of armed conflict and targeting. These principles are the yard stick by which we must measure our proposed actions and by which we must govern our conduct. The principles of importance here are those born of humanitarian concerns. The most basic principle is that the right of a belligerent to injure the enemy is not unlimited.
iii
The principles of military necessity, proportionality, and In recent history, the U.S. has repeatedly labeled opposing regimes as strategic centers of gravity. Examples include the Iraqi regime and the North Korean regime. We know that these totalitarian regimes are ruled by the edicts of single individuals. It therefore appears quite logical that targeting these leaders is the way to quick and decisive victory by eliminating the strategic center of gravity.
However, a close examination of centers of gravity might reveal that we erred in our designation of these leaders as strategic centers of gravity.
Deciding what is and is not an enemy center of gravity is not an exact science, it is an important part of the art of operational war.
Accepting an enemy leader or regime as a strategic center of gravity requires careful and critical consideration. Centers of gravity that are intangible, like enemy will and morale are inherently vague and difficult to analyze. Killing an individual leader, whether it is lawful conduct pursuant to armed conflict or an unlawful assassination, is highly unpredictable in its range of consequences.
xxxvi Conversely, physical centers of gravity are subject to objective analysis. A campaign that plans to eliminate the physical capability of the enemy to do harm is superior to the campaign that seeks to eliminate his will to do harm. In the former we know when the enemy can no longer hurt us through objective standards, in the latter we can only hope that the enemy chooses not to do so.
Selecting an enemy leader as a center of gravity appears to be a natural and logical outgrowth of offensive command and control warfare. Eliminating a totalitarian leader, like Hussein, gets to the root of the problem, the commander himself. However, this is a distortion of offensive command and control warfare. The appropriate target of command and control warfare is the act of commanding (the ability of operational leaders to orchestrate their forces), not the commander. This is an important distinction because destroying the commander does not destroy the capability (of someone else) to command.
Properly identifying centers of gravity has never been easy. Proponents of targeting enemy leaders often assume that killing the leader is all that is necessary to achieve success. This is a poor assumption for a couple of reasons. First, the successor to power might be no better, or even worse, than his predecessor. In a totalitarian regime, it is more likely that the enemy leader has surrounded himself with people of like mind and loyalty than with those of opposing opinions and beliefs. Another problem is that it is dangerous to assume that the "bad" guy in our eyes is seen in the same way by his own people. This is one time when mirror imaging might be a useful exercise. What would U.S. reaction be to the specific targeting of the Commander-in-Chief?
Those who argue that all we need do is kill the totalitarian ruler are guilty of script writing. The script assumes the people dislike the ruler, that they do not dislike us, and that his death will bring immediate reform. The script ignores the possibility that the ruler is not as hated as we believe, that we are hated more than we believe, and that there is another leader of the same caliber in waiting, now armed with a political tool to gather the support of his own people.
All Vego, 307. xxxvi For a discussion of the effects and success of killing individual leaders see Ford, 387.
xxxvii The quick capitulation of Napoleon III to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War resulted in a new revolutionary government with whom Bismarck was unable to negotiate a quick end to the war. "Taking out" Napoleon frustrated Germany's desire for a quick decisive victory.
xxxviii Vego, 363. xxxix Weinberger Doctrine provides that military force should be used only when the particular engagement is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies, we have a clear intention of winning, we have clearly defined political and military objectives and that we send the forces needed to accomplish the objectives, we continually reassess and adjust our objectives and forces, we have the support of the American people and Congress, and we commit forces to combat as a last resort. Taken from the text of an address by SecDef Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club, as reported in New York Times, November 12, 1984.
